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File · APT30 · Nation-state · assessed origin China · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

APT30

  • G0013
  • ISTHMUS CASTLE

state sponsor · ChinaMITRE G0013 ↗

APT30 — ATT&CK roseAP

attack rose · 2 techniques across 2 tactics

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches

Observed targets (as stated by the sources)

7 countries · 1 sectors
United StatesSouth KoreaSaudi ArabiaThailandVietnamMalaysiaIndiaAssessed origin: China

assessed origin · Chinaobserved targets · 7

countries · 7

  • United States
  • South Korea
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Thailand
  • Vietnam
  • Malaysia
  • India

sectors · 1

  • Government

as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

2 techniques · 2 of 15 tactics

  1. Initial access

    1 technique
  2. Execution

    1 technique

select a technique

Arsenal

5 malware
Malware
Malware · 5ATT&CK
SHIPSHAPES0028 ↗
BACKSPACES0031 ↗
FLASHFLOODS0036 ↗
NETEAGLES0034 ↗
SPACESHIPS0035 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

Primary-source reports

via APTnotes · linked, never re-hosted
  1. 2015APT30 And The Mechanics Of A Long-Running Cyber Espionage OperationFireEye ↗

Take it with you

keyless · no signup

References

7 sources
  1. 1.attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013
  2. 2.www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf
  3. 3.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups
  4. 4.cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-a…
  5. 5.attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013
  6. 6.securelist.com/the-naikon-apt/69953
  7. 7.media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30…

Track APT30 on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

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