File · Kimsuky · Nation-state · assessed origin North Korea · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06
Kimsuky
- Velvet Chollima
- Black Banshee
- Thallium
- Operation Stolen Pencil
- G0086
- APT43
- Emerald Sleet
- THALLIUM
state sponsor · Korea (Democratic People's Republic of)MITRE G0094 ↗
attack rose · 130 techniques across 15 tactics
Analyst brief
misp-galaxy + mitre-attackThis threat actor targets South Korean think tanks, industry, nuclear power operators, and the Ministry of Unification for espionage purposes.
Observed targets (as stated by the sources)
1 countries · 8 sectorsassessed origin · North Koreaobserved targets · 1
countries · 1
- Germany
sectors · 8
- Government
- Private sector
- Research - Innovation
- Energy
- Defense
- Diplomacy
- Academia - University
- News - Media
also stated: Ministry of Unification, Sejong Institute, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred
Kill chain
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique130 techniques · 15 of 15 tactics
Reconnaissance
10 techniquesResource development
15 techniquesInitial access
4 techniquesExecution
11 techniquesPersistence
7 techniquesPrivilege escalation
1 techniqueStealth
31 techniquesDefense impairment
4 techniquesCredential access
8 techniquesDiscovery
11 techniquesLateral movement
3 techniquesCollection
11 techniquesCommand and control
9 techniquesExfiltration
3 techniquesImpact
2 techniques
select a technique
Arsenal
13 malware · 6 toolsas stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id
CVEs Kimsuky is cited as exploiting
none on KEV- CVE-2020-06882026-10-17
“Kimsuky has exploited various vulnerabilities for initial access, including Microsoft Exchange vulnerability CVE-2020-0688.”
cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17
Each line is what a source says, quoted, with the source linked under it. A citation is a source's claim, not our confirmation: read the source before you act on it.
Primary-source reports
via APTnotes · linked, never re-hostedTake it with you
keyless · no signupReferences
25 sources- 1.securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915
- 2.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/kimsuky
- 3.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-data-privacy/research/tracking-k…
- 4.youtu.be/hAsKp43AZmM?t=1027
- 5.bloomberglaw.com/document/public/subdoc/X67FPNDOUBV9VOPS35A4864BFIU?ima…
- 6.netscout.com/blog/asert/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia
- 7.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-th…
- 8.attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086
- 9.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a
- 10.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware…
- +15 more in the JSON record
Track Kimsuky on the wire.
This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.
Check your stack
Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.
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