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File · ProjectSauron · Nation-state · assessed origin United States · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

ProjectSauron

  • Strider
  • Sauron
  • Project Sauron
  • G0041

state sponsor · United StatesMITRE G0041 ↗

ProjectSauron — ATT&CK rosePR

attack rose · 3 techniques across 3 tactics

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods. Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim.

Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry. That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world. Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area.

The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the Lua scripts.

Observed targets (as stated by the sources)

6 countries · 3 sectors
RussiaIranBelgiumChinaSwedenRwandaAssessed origin: United States

assessed origin · United Statesobserved targets · 6

countries · 6

  • Russia
  • Iran
  • Belgium
  • China
  • Sweden
  • Rwanda

sectors · 3

  • Government
  • Military
  • Intelligence

as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

3 techniques · 3 of 15 tactics

  1. Stealth

    1 technique
  2. Defense impairment

    1 technique
  3. Command and control

    1 technique

select a technique

Arsenal

1 malware
Malware
Malware · 1ATT&CK
RemsecS0125 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

Primary-source reports

via APTnotes · linked, never re-hosted
  1. 2016Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targetsSymantec ↗
  2. 2016The ProjectSauron APTKaspersky ↗

Take it with you

keyless · no signup

References

9 sources
  1. 1.securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt
  2. 2.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/project-sauron
  3. 3.community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/libraryd…
  4. 4.media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07190154/The-Proje…
  5. 5.attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041
  6. 6.attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041
  7. 7.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-s…
  8. 8.securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533
  9. 9.securelist.com/files/2016/07/The-ProjectSauron-APT_research_KL.pdf

Track ProjectSauron on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

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