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NVD published 25 Jun 2026

CVE-2026-53264

2 public exploits.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a race with an associated action. Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER: 0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock 0: rcu_read_lock() 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR) 0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR 1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action 1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree(). Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu(). Let's illustrate the new restored code path: 0: rcu_read_lock() 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) 1: mutex_unlock() 1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0 1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR. CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace period, so no UAF can occur.

Signals

KEV, exploited in the wild
no
EPSS, 30-day forecast
0.5%, 42th percentile (as of 18 Nov 2026)
CVSS, NVD, HIGH
7.8
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Internet exposure
not stated

Not in CISA's catalogue as of the last daily pull. Absence is not proof of safety.

Timeline 25 Jun 2026 to today

33 days from disclosure to the first proof of concept
Disclosed 25 Jun 2026First PoC 28 Jul 2026today
  1. Disclosed
  2. First PoC+33 d

33 days from disclosure to the first proof of concept

Indicators none tied yet

No threat feed has tied an indicator to this CVE yet. Checked every six hours.

On the wire 1 dispatch

  1. Researcher Says AI Helped Develop Linux Traffic-Control Race Into Root Exploit

Public exploit code 2 known · links only

GitHub PoCs 2Metasploit 0Exploit-DB 0

GitHub PoCs, by trust then stars2

  1. HORKimhab/CVE-2026-53264Trust ok 1003 stars

    CVE-2026-53264 - Draft or Todo

    created 28 Jul 2026

  2. b1nhack/CVE-2026-53264Trust ok 1001 stars

    created 16 Oct 2026

Fake proof-of-concept repositories have been used to deliver malware to the researchers who run them. The trust verdict is our engine's heuristic over the repository (account age, what it ships, how its stars arrived); it is a reason to read the code first, not a finding about its author.

References

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