CVE-2026-58197
ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol servers. Prior to ToolHive CLI 0.30.1 and ToolHive Studio 0.38.0, locally run MCP server containers use the default network permission profile without network isolation, permitting access to host.docker.internal while ToolHive API and MCP proxy endpoints are reachable without authentication. A malicious or compromised MCP server can use the Docker gateway to contact host-local services, other ToolHive-managed MCP proxies, or the ToolHive control plane without escaping the container. This access can expose data and logs, invoke sibling MCP tools, alter process or workload state, and disrupt services. ToolHive Studio additionally sends network_isolation as false and overrides the backend's secure isolation default. This issue is fixed in ToolHive CLI 0.30.1 and ToolHive Studio 0.38.0.
Not on KEV
Not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue as of the last daily pull. Absence is not proof of safety.
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FIRST has not scored this id yet.
8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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No exposure census on this CVE's dispatches.
- nvd.nist.gov ↗
- first.org · EPSS ↗
- github.com/stacklok/toolhive-studio/commit/968182d7f3ee1e55123369e66ad88f82128119b0 ↗
- github.com/stacklok/toolhive-studio/pull/2469 ↗
- github.com/stacklok/toolhive-studio/releases/tag/v0.38.0 ↗
- github.com/stacklok/toolhive/commit/d8f40cb1599b8bf66657f2dfff15bfbfc236e712 ↗
- github.com/stacklok/toolhive/pull/5583 ↗
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