NVD published 16 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-61599
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)
Signals
- KEV, exploited in the wild
- no
- EPSS, 30-day forecast
- 0.6%, 50th percentile (as of 18 Nov 2026)
- CVSS, NVD
- not stated
- Internet exposure
- not stated
Not in CISA's catalogue as of the last daily pull. Absence is not proof of safety. No score published by NVD.
Indicators none tied yet
No threat feed has tied an indicator to this CVE yet. Checked every six hours.
On the wire 1 dispatch
Public exploit code none in our sources
No public exploit in the sources we track: GitHub proof-of-concept lists, Metasploit and Exploit-DB. Absence is not proof that none exists.
References
Watch this one?
KEV additions reach Telegram and the KEV-only RSS as they land.