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NVD published 19 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-75595

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.

Signals

KEV, exploited in the wild
no
EPSS, 30-day forecast
0.3%, 25th percentile (as of 18 Nov 2026)
CVSS, NVD, CRITICAL
9.1
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Internet exposure
not stated

Not in CISA's catalogue as of the last daily pull. Absence is not proof of safety.

Indicators none tied yet

No threat feed has tied an indicator to this CVE yet. Checked every six hours.

On the wire 1 dispatch

  1. GHSA-c4c3-7fpv-j4q5: Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

Public exploit code none in our sources

No public exploit in the sources we track: GitHub proof-of-concept lists, Metasploit and Exploit-DB. Absence is not proof that none exists.

References

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