CVE-2026-75595
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
Not on KEV
Not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue as of the last daily pull. Absence is not proof of safety.
0%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, 25th percentile of all CVEs. A forecast; KEV outranks it.
—
no vector published
—
No exposure census on this CVE's dispatches.
- nvd.nist.gov ↗
- first.org · EPSS ↗
- github.com/netty/netty/commit/1b5abc6443b63726c72cdd285af2feb7ddbb8ff7 ↗
- github.com/netty/netty/commit/9e0519239108a69b7e9bbc5e9182ee139a0d7961 ↗
- github.com/netty/netty/pull/17213 ↗
- github.com/netty/netty/pull/17217 ↗
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.137.Final ↗
Watch this one?
Early access opens alerts first — one email when a CVE you follow lands on KEV or an adversary you follow lands on the wire. Nothing else, ever.