GHSA-6jp4-8v48-cc5v: Electrum: Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it
Source: github.com
The main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool ("unconfirmed") transactions. This is documented [design](https://electrum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/faq.html#does-electrum-trust-servers). [0] However now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it: - when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it, - and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address. - Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design). …
Signalsas the pipeline stamped them
High Critical vulnerability — CVSS 9.3
What to do
- Critical severity — schedule an urgent patch.
CVEKEV and EPSS where known
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