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File · APT5 · Unknown · assessed origin China · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

APT5

  • KEYHOLE PANDA
  • MANGANESE
  • BRONZE FLEETWOOD
  • TEMP.Bottle
  • Mulberry Typhoon
  • Poisoned Flight
  • BASALT CASTLE
  • Keyhole Panda

MITRE G1023 ↗

APT5 — ATT&CK roseAP

attack rose · 29 techniques across 10 tactics

What changed

ledger · newest first
  1. —todaynew CVE1 new CVE: CVE-2022-27518

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

We have observed one APT group, which we call APT5, particularly focused on telecommunications and technology companies. More than half of the organizations we have observed being targeted or breached by APT5 operate in these sectors. Several times, APT5 has targeted organizations and personnel based in Southeast Asia.

APT5 has been active since at least 2007. It appears to be a large threat group that consists of several subgroups, often with distinct tactics and infrastructure. APT5 has targeted or breached organizations across multiple industries, but its focus appears to be on telecommunications and technology companies, especially information about satellite communications.

APT5 targeted the network of an electronics firm that sells products for both industrial and military applications. The group subsequently stole communications related to the firm’s business relationship with a national military, including inventories and memoranda about specific products they provided. In one case in late 2014, APT5 breached the network of an international telecommunications company.

The group used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the computer of an executive who manages the company’s relationships with other telecommunications companies

Observed targets (as stated by the sources)

0 countries · 3 sectors
Assessed origin: China

assessed origin · Chinaobserved targets · 0

sectors · 3

  • Electronic
  • Telecoms
  • Technology

as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

29 techniques · 10 of 15 tactics

  1. Resource development

    1 technique
  2. Initial access

    1 technique
  3. Execution

    3 techniques
  4. Persistence

    4 techniques
  5. Stealth

    8 techniques
  6. Defense impairment

    1 technique
  7. Credential access

    2 techniques
  8. Discovery

    4 techniques
  9. Lateral movement

    2 techniques
  10. Collection

    3 techniques

select a technique

Arsenal

8 malware · 5 tools
Malware
Malware · 8ATT&CK
PoisonIvyS0012 ↗
RAPIDPULSES1113 ↗
SLOWPULSES1104 ↗
SLIGHTPULSES1110 ↗
Skeleton KeyS0007 ↗
PACEMAKERS1109 ↗
gh0st RATS0032 ↗
PULSECHECKS1108 ↗
Tools
Tools · 5ATT&CK
TasklistS0057 ↗
PcShareS1050 ↗
MimikatzS0002 ↗
NetS0039 ↗
netstatS0104 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

CVEs APT5 is cited as using in a campaign

none on KEV
  1. CVE-2022-275182026-10-17
    1. “SPACEHOP Activity has enabled the exploitation of CVE-2022-27518 and CVE-2022-27518 for illegitimate access.”

      cited as used in a campaign · named nearby · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17

Each line is what a source says, quoted, with the source linked under it. A citation is a source's claim, not our confirmation: read the source before you act on it.

Take it with you

keyless · no signup

References

13 sources
  1. 1.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html
  2. 2.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-south…
  3. 3.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-fleetwood
  4. 4.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups
  5. 5.query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWMFIi
  6. 6.internal-www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leve…
  7. 7.cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/updated-cyber-threat-a…
  8. 8.attack.mitre.org/groups/G1023
  9. 9.web.archive.org/web/20220122121143/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam…
  10. 10.learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-th…
  11. +3 more in the JSON record

Track APT5 on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

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