File · DEV-0586 · Nation-state · assessed origin Russia · refreshed 2026-10-18
DEV-0586
- Ruinous Ursa
- Cadet Blizzard
- UNC2589
- Bleeding Bear
- Frozenvista
- UAC-0056
state sponsor · Russian FederationMITRE G1003 ↗
attack rose · 47 techniques across 14 tactics
Analyst brief
MSTIC has not found any notable associations between this observed activity, tracked as DEV-0586, and other known activity groups. MSTIC assesses that the malware (WhisperGate), which is designed to look like ransomware but lacking a ransom recovery mechanism, is intended to be destructive and designed to render targeted devices inoperable rather than to obtain a ransom.
Observed targets (as stated by the sources)
1 countries · 0 sectorsassessed origin · Russiaobserved targets · 1
countries · 1
- Ukraine
as stated by the cited sources, not inferred
Kill chain
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique47 techniques · 14 of 15 tactics
Reconnaissance
2 techniquesResource development
5 techniquesInitial access
2 techniquesExecution
4 techniquesPersistence
2 techniquesStealth
4 techniquesDefense impairment
1 techniqueCredential access
7 techniquesDiscovery
3 techniquesLateral movement
4 techniquesCollection
5 techniquesCommand and control
5 techniquesExfiltration
1 techniqueImpact
2 techniques
select a technique
Arsenal
4 malware · 7 toolsas stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id
Detections
9 rules · Sigma · QRadar · CortexGenerated by skopnix from this finding, each with false-positive notes. Open the list →
Primary-source reports
linked, never re-hosted- 2022Cyber attack of UAC-0056 group on state organizations of Ukraine using malicious programs SaintBot and OutSteel (CERT-UA #3799)CERT-UA ↗
- 2022Threat Actor UAC-0056 Targeting Ukraine with Fake Translation SoftwareSentinelone ↗
- 2022UAC-0056 cyberattack on Ukrainian authorities using GraphSteel and GrimPlant malwareCERT_UA ↗
Take it with you
keyless · no signupReferences
10 sources- 1.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting…
- 2.msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/02/28/analysis-resources-cyber-threat-activity-uk…
- 3.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/ruinousursa
- 4.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-…
- 5.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrain…
- 6.attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003
- 7.crowdstrike.com/blog/who-is-ember-bear
- 8.mandiant.com/resources/russia-invasion-ukraine-retaliation
- 9.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot
- 10.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military…
Track DEV-0586 on the wire.
This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.
Check your stack
Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.
Stack checkNo key. No signup.