File · SaintBear · Unknown · assessed origin Russia · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06
attack rose · 47 techniques across 14 tactics
Analyst brief
misp-galaxy + mitre-attackA group targeting UA state organizations using the GraphSteel and GrimPlant malware.
Kill chain
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique47 techniques · 14 of 15 tactics
Reconnaissance
2 techniquesResource development
5 techniquesInitial access
2 techniquesExecution
4 techniquesPersistence
2 techniquesStealth
4 techniquesDefense impairment
1 techniqueCredential access
7 techniquesDiscovery
3 techniquesLateral movement
4 techniquesCollection
5 techniquesCommand and control
5 techniquesExfiltration
1 techniqueImpact
2 techniques
select a technique
Arsenal
4 malware · 7 toolsas stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id
CVEs SaintBear is cited as exploiting
none on KEV- CVE-2022-410402026-10-17
“Cadet Blizzard is also known for exploiting Confluence servers through the CVE-2021-26084 vulnerability, Exchange servers through multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2022-41040 and ProxyShell”
cited as exploiting · source: microsoft.com ↗ · 2026-10-17
“Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange”
cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17
- CVE-2021-260842026-10-17
“Cadet Blizzard is also known for exploiting Confluence servers through the CVE-2021-26084 vulnerability, Exchange servers through multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2022-41040 and ProxyShell”
cited as exploiting · source: microsoft.com ↗ · 2026-10-17
“Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange”
cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17
- CVE-2017-118822026-10-17
“Saint Bear has leveraged vulnerabilities in client applications such as CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office to enable code execution in victim environments.”
cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17
“The document named Letter Confirm.doc is a CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability document, and the following content is displayed after opening:”
cited as exploiting · named nearby · source: nsfocusglobal.com ↗ · 2026-10-17
Each line is what a source says, quoted, with the source linked under it. A citation is a source's claim, not our confirmation: read the source before you act on it.
Primary-source reports
via APTnotes · linked, never re-hosted- 2022Cyber attack of UAC-0056 group on state organizations of Ukraine using malicious programs SaintBot and OutSteel (CERT-UA #3799)CERT-UA ↗
- 2022APT Group LOREC53 (Lori Bear) Recently Launched A Large-Scale Cyber Attack On Ukrainensfocus ↗
- 2022Threat Actor UAC-0056 Targeting Ukraine with Fake Translation SoftwareSentinelone ↗
- 2022UAC-0056 cyberattack on Ukrainian authorities using GraphSteel and GrimPlant malwareCERT_UA ↗
Take it with you
keyless · no signupReferences
19 sources- 1.malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.graphsteel
- 2.cert.gov.ua/article/38374
- 3.blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/new-uac-0056-activity-ther…
- 4.intezer.com/blog/research/elephant-malware-targeting-ukrainian-orgs
- 5.sentinelone.com/blog/threat-actor-uac-0056-targeting-ukraine-with-fake…
- 6.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/atoms/nascentursa
- 7.symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/nodaria-ukraine-infostealer
- 8.blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-confl…
- 9.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-…
- 10.circleid.com/posts/20230412-probing-lorec53-phishing-through-the-dn…
- +9 more in the JSON record
Track SaintBear on the wire.
This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.
Check your stack
Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.
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