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File · TeamPCP · Unknown · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

TeamPCP

  • Altered Spider
  • PCPcat
  • ShellForce
  • DeadCatx3
  • CanisterWorm
  • PCPCat
  • SHADOW-WATER-058
  • UNC6780

MITRE G1056 ↗

TeamPCP — ATT&CK roseTE

attack rose · 36 techniques across 12 tactics

Last 30 days

last seen 22 d ago
dispatch1
victims0
CVEs seen0

What changed

ledger · newest first
  1. —todaynew CVE5 new CVEs: CVE-2025-29927, CVE-2025-55182, CVE-2026-33634, CVE-2026-45321, CVE-2026-48027
  2. —21 d agoresurfacedback on the wire after 28 quiet days

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

TeamPCP is a threat actor that has executed a coordinated series of supply chain attacks, compromising widely-used open source tools such as Trivy, KICS, and LiteLLM to deploy credential-stealing malware. They employed techniques like credential harvesting, lateral movement within Kubernetes environments, and audio steganography to evade detection. The group has demonstrated the ability to leverage stolen credentials to propagate attacks across multiple ecosystems, including npm and PyPI, using a self-propagating worm known as CanisterWorm. Their operations have included the use of AES-256 encryption and RSA-4096 for exfiltration of sensitive data.

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

36 techniques · 12 of 15 tactics

  1. Resource development

    8 techniques
  2. Initial access

    2 techniques
  3. Execution

    5 techniques
  4. Persistence

    4 techniques
  5. Privilege escalation

    1 technique
  6. Stealth

    6 techniques
  7. Defense impairment

    1 technique
  8. Credential access

    3 techniques
  9. Lateral movement

    1 technique
  10. Collection

    1 technique
  11. Command and control

    1 technique
  12. Impact

    3 techniques

select a technique

Arsenal

3 malware
Malware
Malware · 3ATT&CK
CanisterWormS9042 ↗
Mini Shai-HuludS9043 ↗
TeamPCP Cloud StealerS9041 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

CVEs cited sources tie to TeamPCP

1 on CISA KEV
  1. CVE-2025-55182KEV2026-10-17
    1. “TeamPCP has exploited misconfigurations in GitHub Actions and vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-33634 in the Aqua Security Trivy scanner and CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell) against vulnerable cloud endpoints.”

      cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17

    2. “CVE-2026-45321 CVE-2025-55182”

      attributed by a report · named nearby · source: ic3.gov ↗ · 2026-10-17

    3. “That campaign exploited the React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182), allowing the group to leverage remote code execution (RCE) within vulnerable cloud endpoints.”

      cited as exploiting · named nearby · source: unit42.paloaltonetworks.com ↗ · 2026-10-17

  2. CVE-2026-453212026-10-17
    1. “CVE-2026-45321 CVE-2025-55182”

      attributed by a report · named nearby · source: ic3.gov ↗ · 2026-10-17

  3. CVE-2026-480272026-10-17
    1. “CVE-2026-33634 CVE-2026-48027”

      attributed by a report · named nearby · source: ic3.gov ↗ · 2026-10-17

  4. CVE-2025-299272026-10-17
    1. “TeamPCP launches mass campaign targeting exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Redis servers, and React2Shell (CVE-2025-29927). Over 60,000 servers compromised globally.”

      cited as exploiting · source: cstromblad.com ↗ · 2026-10-17

    2. “Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) : React2Shell (CVE-2025-29927) exploitation against Next.js applications.”

      cited as exploiting · named nearby · source: flare.io ↗ · 2026-10-17

  5. CVE-2026-336342026-10-17
    1. “TeamPCP has exploited misconfigurations in GitHub Actions and vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-33634 in the Aqua Security Trivy scanner and CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell) against vulnerable cloud endpoints.”

      cited as exploiting · source: attack.mitre.org ↗ · 2026-10-17

    2. “CVE-2026-33634 CVE-2026-48027”

      attributed by a report · named nearby · source: ic3.gov ↗ · 2026-10-17

Each line is what a source says, quoted, with the source linked under it. A citation is a source's claim, not our confirmation: read the source before you act on it.

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References

14 sources
  1. 1.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/c/teampcp-telnyx-attack-marks-a-shif…
  2. 2.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/c/inside-litellm-supply-chain-compro…
  3. 3.tracebit.com/blog/detecting-cicd-supply-chain-attacks-with-canary-c…
  4. 4.crowdstrike.com/en-us/adversaries/altered-spider
  5. 5.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260702.pdf
  6. 6.flare.io/learn/resources/blog/teampcp-cloud-native-ransomware
  7. 7.cstromblad.com/posts/threat-actor-profile-teampcp
  8. 8.attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056
  9. 9.github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GHSA-69fq-xp46-…
  10. 10.aquasec.com/blog/trivy-supply-chain-attack-what-you-need-to-know
  11. +4 more in the JSON record

Track TeamPCP on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

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