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File · LOTUS PANDA · Nation-state · assessed origin China · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

LOTUS PANDA

  • Spring Dragon
  • ST Group
  • DRAGONFISH
  • BRONZE ELGIN
  • ATK1
  • G0030
  • Red Salamander
  • Lotus BLossom

state sponsor · ChinaMITRE G0030 ↗

LOTUS PANDA — ATT&CK roseLP

attack rose · 21 techniques across 9 tactics

What changed

ledger · newest first
  1. —todaynew CVE2 new CVEs: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-6332

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.

Observed targets (as stated by the sources)

6 countries · 3 sectors
JapanPhilippinesHong KongIndonesiaTaiwanVietnamAssessed origin: China

assessed origin · Chinaobserved targets · 6

countries · 6

  • Japan
  • Philippines
  • Hong Kong
  • Indonesia
  • Taiwan
  • Vietnam

sectors · 3

  • Military
  • Government
  • Government, Administration

as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

21 techniques · 9 of 15 tactics

  1. Resource development

    1 technique
  2. Execution

    1 technique
  3. Persistence

    1 technique
  4. Stealth

    1 technique
  5. Defense impairment

    1 technique
  6. Credential access

    1 technique
  7. Discovery

    10 techniques
  8. Collection

    3 techniques
  9. Command and control

    2 techniques

select a technique

Arsenal

4 malware · 5 tools
Malware
Malware · 4ATT&CK
EmissaryS0082 ↗
EliseS0081 ↗
HannotogS1211 ↗
SagerunexS1210 ↗
Tools
Tools · 5ATT&CK
AdFindS0552 ↗
PingS0097 ↗
ImpacketS0357 ↗
NBTscanS0590 ↗
certutilS0160 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

CVEs LOTUS PANDA is cited as exploiting

none on KEV
  1. CVE-2012-01582026-10-17
    1. “While this particular actor effectively used their almost worn out CVE-2012-0158 exploits in the past, Spring Dragon employs more involved and creative intrusive activity as well.”

      cited as exploiting · source: securelist.com ↗ · 2026-10-17

    2. “The group’s spearphish toolset includes PDF exploits, Adobe Flash Player exploits, and the common CVE-2012-0158 Word exploits including those generated from the infamous “Tran Duy Linh” kit.”

      cited as exploiting · named nearby · source: securelist.com ↗ · 2026-10-17

  2. CVE-2014-63322026-10-17
    1. “The actors attempted to exploit CVE-2014-6332 using a slightly modified version of the proof-of-concept (POC) code to install a Trojan called Emissary, which is related to the Operation Lotus Blossom campaign.”

      cited as exploiting · source: unit42.paloaltonetworks.com ↗ · 2026-10-17

Each line is what a source says, quoted, with the source linked under it. A citation is a source's claim, not our confirmation: read the source before you act on it.

Primary-source reports

via APTnotes · linked, never re-hosted
  1. 2016Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It To EvolvePalo Alto ↗
  2. 2016Attack On French Diplomat Linked To Operation Lotus BlossomPalo Alto ↗

Take it with you

keyless · no signup

References

20 sources
  1. 1.securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt
  2. 2.securelist.com/spring-dragon-updated-activity/79067
  3. 3.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/lotus-blossom
  4. 4.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-lotus-blossom
  5. 5.accenture.com/t00010101T000000Z__w__/gb-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accentur…
  6. 6.unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-bl…
  7. 7.community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2018/02/13/lotus-bl…
  8. 8.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Z_w_/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-…
  9. 9.attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030
  10. 10.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-elgin
  11. +10 more in the JSON record

Track LOTUS PANDA on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

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