Skip to content
Section B · Adversaries · Dossier
← Adversaries

File · Storm-1567 · Unknown · misp-galaxy + mitre-attack · refreshed 2026-10-06

Storm-1567

  • Akira
  • PUNK SPIDER
  • GOLD SAHARA
  • Howling Scorpius

MITRE G1024 ↗

Storm-1567 — ATT&CK roseST

attack rose · 17 techniques across 11 tactics

Last 30 days

last seen 14 d ago
dispatches0
victims19
CVEs seen0
seen against
United States · Mexico · Brazil · Italy
sectors
Manufacturing · Professional Services · Not Found · Other · Agriculture and Food Production

What changed

ledger · newest first
  1. —17 d agovictimsvictim count 75 → 85 (+10)
  2. —24 d agovictimsvictim count 65 → 75 (+10)
  3. —1 mo agovictimsvictim count 58 → 65 (+7)

Analyst brief

misp-galaxy + mitre-attack

Storm-1567 is the threat actor behind the Ransomware-as-a-Service Akira. They attacked Swedish organizations in March 2023. This ransomware utilizes the ChaCha encryption algorithm, PowerShell, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Microsoft's Defender for Endpoint successfully blocked a large-scale hacking campaign carried out by Storm-1567, highlighting the effectiveness of their security solution.

Observed targets (as stated by the sources)

8 countries · 12 sectors
United StatesGermanyBrazilMexicoUnited KingdomSwitzerlandItalyCanada

assessed originnot stated by sourcesobserved targets · 8

countries · 8

  • United States
  • Germany
  • Brazil
  • Mexico
  • United Kingdom
  • Switzerland
  • Italy
  • Canada

sectors · 12

  • Manufacturing
  • Professional Services
  • Not Found
  • Other
  • Retail & E-Commerce
  • Technology
  • Agriculture and Food Production
  • Transportation
  • Energy & Utilities
  • Financial Services
  • Hospitality
  • Healthcare

as stated by MISP galaxy / ransomware.live — not inferred

Kill chain

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise · tap a technique

17 techniques · 11 of 15 tactics

  1. Execution

    1 technique
  2. Persistence

    1 technique
  3. Stealth

    3 techniques
  4. Defense impairment

    1 technique
  5. Credential access

    1 technique
  6. Discovery

    2 techniques
  7. Lateral movement

    1 technique
  8. Collection

    2 techniques
  9. Command and control

    1 technique
  10. Exfiltration

    1 technique
  11. Impact

    3 techniques

select a technique

Arsenal

3 malware · 5 tools
Malware
Malware · 3ATT&CK
Akira _v2S1194 ↗
AkiraS1129 ↗
MegazordS1191 ↗
Tools
Tools · 5ATT&CK
MimikatzS0002 ↗
PsExecS0029 ↗
AdFindS0552 ↗
LaZagneS0349 ↗
RcloneS1040 ↗

as stated by MITRE ATT&CK · “shared by” counts roster dossiers citing the same S-id

Take it with you

keyless · no signup

References

12 sources
  1. 1.news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/12/20/cryptoguard-an-asymmetric-approach-to…
  2. 2.securelist.com/crimeware-report-fakesg-akira-amos/111483
  3. 3.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/akira-ransomware…
  4. 4.blog.sekoia.io/sekoia-io-mid-2023-ransomware-threat-landscape
  5. 5.decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/avast-q2-2023-threat-report
  6. 6.attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024
  7. 7.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/aa24-109a-stopransomware-a…
  8. 8.crowdstrike.com/adversaries/punk-spider
  9. 9.blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve
  10. 10.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-sahara
  11. +2 more in the JSON record

Track Storm-1567 on the wire.

This dossier is already data: the keyless actor API and a STIX 2.1 bundle. Mentions on the wire reach Telegram and RSS as they land.

Check your stack

Paste what you run: the CVEs exploited in the wild against it, and who is cited as exploiting them, with the report.

Stack checkNo key. No signup.